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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

A TALE OF TWO INTEROPERABILITIES; OR, HOW
GOOGLE V. ORACLE COULD BECOME SOCIAL
MEDIA LEGISLATION
Charles Duan †

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.
has provided the latest word on an issue that many have described as
“interoperability,” and it comes at a time when lawmakers around the world are
debating a policy called “interoperability” with respect to major Internet platforms.
At first glance, these two similarly named policy conversations—copyright
protection of software interfaces and interconnection among competing Internet
platforms, respectively—have little to do with each other. Yet they are vitally
intertwined: the activities and issues featured in Google are so closely linked to the
questions of digital competition that interoperability reforms directed to the latter
cannot be achieved effectively without also addressing the former.
This close tie between two aspects of interoperability has a perhaps surprising
implication: Congress can and should expand upon the recent Google decision as
part of its larger efforts to induce competition in the social media and major
† Senior policy fellow, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, American
University Washington College of Law; senior fellow for technology and innovation policy, R
Street Institute. The author was counsel of record on the brief of amici curiae the R Street Institute,
Public Knowledge, and the Niskanen Center, which the Supreme Court quoted in its Google LLC
v. Oracle America, Inc. decision. See 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1203–04 (2021). I would like to thank Clark
Asay, Jon Band, Zach Graves, James Grimmelmann, Eric Stallman, Ali Sternburg, and counsel
involved with the litigation for their thoughts and comments that contributed to the content of this
Article, as well as the editors of the Cardozo Law Review de•novo. All errors are my own.

246

2021]

A TALE OF TWO INTEROPERABILITIES

247

technology platform markets. Barriers to replication of software interfaces, such as
copyrights in Google, can stymie the robustly competitive digital landscape that
lawmakers hope to achieve through interoperability legislation. Drawing from
history and current policy, this Article proposes ways that Congress can respond to
the Google decision, ranging from developing copyright-free government standards
to revising the Copyright Act.
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INTRODUCTION
“You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think
it means.” 1 It would not be inconceivable to say such of
“interoperability,” a term notoriously difficult to define. 2 Indeed, the term
is central to two important contemporary issues of legal policy that
seemingly have nothing to do with each other and use interoperability to
mean apparently different things.
The first of these issues is a matter of computer software and
copyright law. In its recent decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America,
Inc., the Supreme Court grappled with whether Google, in building its
Android mobile platform, was allowed to copy certain portions of
computer code from the Java programming language. 3 The portions of
Java that Google copied were not arbitrary, but were specifically selected
to help knowledgeable Java programmers transition more easily to
writing for the Android platform. 4 Insofar as this copyright question
involved the ability of programmers and their code to operate between
(inter-) two different platforms, commentators have widely described the
case and the related software copyright question generally as a matter of
interoperability. 5
At nearly the same time, lawmakers and policy experts around the
world have debated another idea called interoperability: regulatory
requirements that dominant Internet platforms, especially in social media,
enable rival firms to connect with those platforms, thereby enabling
greater competition. 6 A notable example is the recent report from the staff
THE PRINCESS BRIDE 16:32 (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).
See, e.g., Wolfgang Kerber & Heike Schweitzer, Interoperability in the Digital Economy, 8
J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 39, 40–41 (2017); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER,
INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 5 (2012).
3 See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1190–95 (2021); infra Section II.
4 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1193–94.
5 See, e.g., Rina Diane Caballar, Google v. Oracle Explained: The Fight for Interoperable
Software, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 19, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/
software/google-v-oracle-explained-supreme-court-news-apis-software [https://perma.cc/CN8VPB8B]; Joseph Gratz & Mark A. Lemley, Platforms and Interoperability in Oracle v. Google, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 603 (2018); Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated
Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 448 (2018) (“Nearly every major litigation from Apple v. Franklin in
1983 through the Oracle v. Google litigation involves interoperability issues.”).
6 See, e.g., Chris Riley, Unpacking Interoperability in Competition, 5 J. CYBER POL’Y 94, 94–
95 (2020) (“[T]he future direction of regulatory travel will be towards the promotion of
interoperability.”); BECKY CHAO & ROSS SCHULMAN, PROMOTING PLATFORM
INTEROPERABILITY 6–7 (New Am.’s Open Tech. Inst. 2020), http://newamerica.org/oti/reports/
1
2
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of the House Judiciary Committee, proposing “[a]n interoperability
requirement [that] would allow competing social networking platforms
to interconnect with dominant firms to ensure that users can communicate
across services.” 7 Such a requirement, characteristic of other
interoperability proposals, 8 “breaks the power of network effects” that
entrench dominant digital platforms and thus enables greater competition,
as the report contends. 9
Despite sharing common terminology, these two policy issues have
not been recognized as connected in either policy debates or scholarly
literature. Recent commentary on digital platform interoperability rarely
notes software copyrights as a relevant concern. 10 While research on
software copyrights recognizes competition concerns at a high level, the
connection to contemporary social media and digital platform regulation

promoting-platform-interoperability
[https://perma.cc/QL8T-7RA8];
IAN
BROWN,
INTEROPERABILITY AS A TOOL FOR COMPETITION REGULATION 5 (OpenForum Acad. 2020),
https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/fbvxd [https://perma.cc/Y6YE-ZXGZ].
7 MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L., HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMM., 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 385 (2020)
[hereinafter
HOUSE
JUDICIARY
REPORT],
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
competition_in_digital_markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU7K-TAUR].
8 See infra notes 27–34 and accompanying text (reviewing proposals).
9 HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 385 (quoting Michael Kades & Fiona Scott
Morton, Interoperability as a Competition Remedy for Digital Networks 13–14 (Wash. Ctr. for
Equitable Growth, working paper, Sept. 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/
interoperability-as-a-competition-remedy-for-digital-networks [https://perma.cc/XT68-XPBG]).
10 See, e.g., Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 951, 997 & n.254 (2021)
(noting role of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which is related to but distinct from copyright
law); Filippo Lancieri & Patricia Morita Sakowski, Competition in Digital Markets: A Review of
Expert Reports, 26 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 65, 155–56 (2021) (discussing privacy and regulatory
effectiveness as primary concerns for platform interoperability); Stanley M. Besen & Philip L.
Verveer, Competition and Data: Potential Remedies, 21 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 102, 142 (2021) (focusing on technical and regulatory issues); Mathew Heim & Igor Nikolic, A
FRAND Regime for Dominant Digital Platforms, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM.
L. 38, 50–55 (2019) (proposing an interoperability arrangement analogous to certain patent
licensing); Konstantinos Stylianou, Exclusion in Digital Markets, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 181, 226–27 (2018) (noting relevance of “compatibility” without identifying particular
barriers thereto). One commentator observes that copyright protection did play a substantial role in
a historical monopolization dispute over telephone books. See Erika M. Douglas, Monopolization
Remedies and Data Privacy, 24 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 47–53 (2020). However, she does not propose
a role for copyright law with respect to contemporary digital platform competition issues. Id. at 68–
73. Others generally recommend an “open” technical standard for platform interoperability. See,
e.g., Riley, supra note 6, at 99–100; Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 9, at 23–24. However, even
“open” technical standards often still fail to address questions of software copyrights. See RUDI
BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A
REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 36 (2012)
(commissioned paper preparatory to NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR
STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013));
Charles Duan, Internet of Infringing Things: The Effect of Computer Interface Copyrights on
Technology Standards, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2019).
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has not been strongly made. 11 Indeed, critics of the Supreme Court’s
Google decision claim that it will entrench dominant Internet platforms,
apparently setting the first type of interoperability at cross-purposes with
the second. 12
Yet, I contend they are closely tied. Interoperability in the social
media sense, often also called “interconnection,” can only achieve the
objectives that lawmakers seek if it is legislated in tandem with
interoperability
in
the
Google
sense,
otherwise
called
“reimplementation.” The complex relationships among participants in
digital markets mean that interconnection requirements alone will not
undo—and in fact may entrench—monopoly power; a serious approach
to competition requires a digital ecosystem that can only be achieved if
reimplementation is permitted unfettered. 13
Corollary to the dual nature of interoperability is the perhaps
surprising possibility that lawmakers ought to be motivated to expand
upon the Supreme Court’s decision through legislation, given their
interest in digital platform interconnection. 14 History shows that
addressing both reimplementation and interconnection is not only

11 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219, 322 (2019) (describing implications of intellectual property for
social media platform competition as a future research direction); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use
Prevails in Oracle v. Google, COMMC’NS ACM, Nov. 2016, at 24, 26; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P.
McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV. 71, 95 (2020); Keith N. Hylton, Digital Platforms
and Antitrust Law, 98 NEB. L. REV. 272, 283 n.28 (2019) (noting possible relevance of Google to
a different question of platform competition, namely startup acquisitions). The closest article,
focusing primarily on European law, notes that “[c]opyrightability of APIs may indirectly affect
the competition policy in software dependent markets” and cites to Google, but provides little
further analysis of the case or the application of copyright law. Jörg Hoffmann & Begoña Gonzalez
Otero, Demystifying the Role of Data Interoperability in the Access and Sharing Debate, 11 J.
INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 252, 273 (2020).
12 See, e.g., Press Release, Oracle Statement Regarding Oracle v. Google (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.oracle.com/news/announcement/oracle-statement-regarding-oracle-v-google040521.html [https://perma.cc/7WMH-TMPD] (claiming that with the decision, “[t]he Google
platform just got bigger and market power greater”).
13 See infra Section III.
14 Cf. Andy Halaby, Valley IP Attorney Highlights Key Patent Cases to Watch in 2021, PHX.
BUS. J. (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2020/11/24/my-view-keypatent-cases-to-watch-in-2021.html [https://perma.cc/E69M-6M5U] (predicting that “meaningful
IP legislation probably is unlikely” after describing the case); Bob Goodlatte, Supreme Court Could
Take Intellectual Property Protections Back 50 Years, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.newsweek.com/supreme-court-could-take-intellectual-property-protections-back-50years-opinion-1533942 [https://perma.cc/N8DR-6EGY] (former House Judiciary Committee chair
advocating on the case but not calling for legislation). The only other mention of post-Google
legislation that I found was a brief Congressional Research Service report noting that “Congress
thus has the power to change the scope of software copyright should it disagree with the decision
in Google v. Oracle” but not specifically seeking such legislation. KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., LSB10543, COPYRIGHT IN CODE: SUPREME COURT HEARS LANDMARK SOFTWARE CASE
IN GOOGLE V. ORACLE 4 (2020), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=846248.
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possible but in fact common, and legislators have a range of options to
do so. 15
I. INTERCONNECTION: TELEPHONE NETWORKS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
In the context of communications law and more recently social
media platform policy, interoperability generally refers to the ability of
third-party services to communicate with an existing, often dominant
platform or system. 16 I will use the term “interconnection” to refer to this
arrangement. 17
A.

Historic Telephone Interconnection

Interconnection has long been a matter of concern for telephone
networks. 18 The earliest telephone networks notably did not feature
interconnection: the dominant Bell network was not connected to its socalled “independent” competitor networks, and one who wanted service
from both Bell and an independent needed to have two separate wires and
two separate telephone handsets. 19
Dissatisfaction with the duplicative nature of the telephone networks
led to the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, in which AT&T agreed to a
limited amount of interconnection where independents could place (but
not receive) calls over AT&T’s long distance wires. 20 While
contemporaries hailed the commitment as a win for competition, the
limited interconnection that AT&T offered in fact increased the
company’s monopoly control, ultimately leading to the demise of most
of the independents. 21 Interconnection was subsequently seen as a
component of deregulation of the telephone industry in the 1980s, the
theory being that opening up AT&T’s networks to calls to and from rival

See infra Section IV.
See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 385.
17 To be clear, “interconnection” is a statutory term of art in telecommunications law and is
defined by regulation. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (2021). That narrower, more
formal term is not what I intend, although interconnection in telecommunications law is certainly
an instance of interconnection as I intend the term.
18 See generally Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft,
and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 274–79 (2009).
19 See MILTON MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION AND
MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 81–88 (digit. ed. 2013),
https://surface.syr.edu/books/18 [https://perma.cc/DG3R-6CHT].
20 See id. at 128–30; JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 6 (2005).
21 See MUELLER, supra note 19, at 128–30.
15
16
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networks would enable competition and reduce the need for monopoly
regulation in the industry. 22
B.

Interconnection and Social Media

More recently, interconnection has become a key part of the debate
over social media and Internet platform dominance. In view of
widespread perceptions that digital platforms have become extremely
concentrated, 23 policymakers and commentators have called to limit the
top firms’ power either through application of antitrust law or with new
legislation. 24
Often comparing those platforms to AT&T’s dominant telephone
network, many commentators consider interconnection to be a potential
solution. 25 By way of example, a dominant social media platform might
be required under such regulations to allow competitors to send and
receive email-like messages between their respective users. 26 To do so,
the dominant platform would have to open itself up to competitors’
transmissions in much the same way that AT&T opened itself up to
telephone call transmissions from competitors.
Governments around the world are giving extensive attention to
interoperability. A report commissioned by the European Commission
Directorate-General for Competition deals extensively with

22 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 20, at 67–68; Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1257–61 (2007).
23 Whether this is so is a matter of debate. Compare HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7,
at 11–12, and STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE
ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT 7 (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/
research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G5HF-EM2X] (“Digital Platforms tend to [be] monopolies . . . .”), with Jonathan Klick, Is the
Digital Economy Too Concentrated?, in THE GLOBAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 413, 416–17 (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2020),
https://gaidigitalreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-Global-Antitrust-Institute-Reporton-the-Digital-Economy_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/29TG-TJUT] (disputing that technology
markets are highly concentrated). Resolving that question is irrelevant here; it is enough that
perceptions of market concentration have driven interest in legislation.
24 See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 20–21; STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
THE ECON. & THE STATE, supra note 23, at 16–21; Rory Van Loo, In Defense of Breakups:
Administering a “Radical” Remedy, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1955, 1956–57, 1957 n.2 (2020).
25 See, e.g., HAROLD FELD, THE CASE FOR THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ACT: MARKET
STRUCTURE
AND
REGULATION
OF
DIGITAL
PLATFORMS
62–66
(2019),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Case_for_the_Digital_Platform_
Act_Harold_Feld_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG8J-RCXH]; Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 9,
at 12–14; STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, supra note 23, at 16.
26 A good discussion of this example is found in BROWN, supra note 6, at 7–14.
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interoperability policy, 27 and E.U. Commissioner for Competition
Margrethe Vestager indicated that she would take the report’s
recommendations under close advisement. 28 The U.K. Competition and
Markets Bureau has also investigated interoperability in depth, 29 as has
the House Judiciary Committee. 30 Several members of Congress have
cosponsored legislation to mandate interconnection by major social
media platforms. 31 And the omnibus privacy laws in Europe 32 and
California 33 both include provisions on data portability, a rudimentary
form of interconnection insofar as data can flow from one platform to a
competitor, albeit slowly in the hands of end users. 34 Interoperability in
the sense of interconnection is thus high on the agenda of many legislators
interested in competition and technology.
II. REIMPLEMENTATION: GOOGLE AND SOFTWARE INTERFACES
A seemingly different type of interoperability is at play in the world
of software copyrights and the Google case: reimplementation, a
particular form of copying in order to enable compatibility. As the
Supreme Court defined the term, reimplementation is “the building of a
system that repurposes the same words and syntaxes of an existing

27 See JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER,
COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 58–60 (Eur. Comm’n Dir.-Gen. for Competition
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RM34-DRKF].
28 See Margrethe Vestager, Eur. Comm’r for Competition, Address at the European Consumer
and Competition Day: Defending Competition in a Digitised World (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129202059/https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/defending-competition-digitised-world_en
[https://perma.cc/6EWG-NG5E].
29 See COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL ADVERTISING:
MARKET
STUDY
FINAL
REPORT
paras.
92–93,
at
26
(2020)
(U.K.),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fa557668fa8f5788db46efc/Final_report_Digital_
ALT_TEXT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QD4-DMMP].
30 See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 384–86.
31 See Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 2019
(ACCESS Act), S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (as introduced in Senate, Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2658.
32 See Parliament & Council Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), arts. 15.1, 20.1, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
43, 45.
33 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(a) (2021).
34 See Paul De Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Gianclaudio Malgieri, Laurent Beslay &
Ignacio Sanchez, The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards User-Centric
Interoperability of Digital Services, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 193, 194 (2018).
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system,” such that users of the existing system can switch over to the new
one with minimal effort. 35
A.

The Facts of Google

The facts of Google highlight what reimplementation is and, more
importantly, why it happens. 36 Oracle is the successor in ownership to a
collection of computer software programs called the Java API, which is
capable of accepting various commands to perform certain useful
computations. 37 So that third-party programs can invoke these
computations, Oracle’s software lays out specific expectations for what
those programs must include—names of commands, filing labels called
“packages” organizing those commands, what information needs to be
given for each command, what the program should expect to get back
from the command, and so on. 38 These expectations are set forth in a
terse, precise, well-defined language, which when written out are what
the litigants have described as “declaring code.” 39
Google, in developing its Android mobile phone platform, wanted
to allow programmers to command its platform to perform computations
similar to parts of the Java API. 40 To do so, Google also needed to lay out
its expectations for how to invoke those computations in declaring code. 41
Google wrote its declaring code in parts to be nearly identical to those in
Oracle’s software, so that programmers experienced with the Java API
could also write for Android with minimal or perhaps no changes to their
expectations and preexisting knowledge. 42

35 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1203 (2021) (alterations and quotations
omitted) (quoting Brief of the R Street Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2,
Google, 141 S. Ct. 1183 (No. 18-956), 2020 WL 242502, https://www.supremecourt.gov/
DocketPDF/18/18-956/128410/20200113155314297_brief-gvo-merits.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
BAP7-CDYG]).
36 See generally Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1190–95; Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc. (Oracle I), 872
F. Supp. 2d 974, 977–83 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Oracle Am., Inc.
v. Google Inc. (Oracle II), 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For a history of the litigation
between Oracle and Google, see generally Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House:
Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1515, 1549–62 (2016).
37 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1190; Oracle I, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 979–82; Oracle II, 750 F.3d at
1349–50.
38 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1191.
39 See id. at 1192.
40 See id. at 1191.
41 See id. at 1193.
42 See id. at 1193–94.
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Google thus built a system “‘that repurposes the same words and
syntaxes’ of an existing system,” 43 namely the declaring code of the Java
API, to ensure that other, external users or programs could switch
between the two. The command words, symbols, and syntaxes that enable
communication between a system like the Java API and its users are what
computer scientists call an “interface,” 44 and copying interfaces to
facilitate third-party switching is the heart of reimplementation.
B.

History of Reimplementation

Like interconnection, reimplementation has a storied history. Coded
symbols for issuing commands have existed at least since Aeneas Tacitus
described the hydraulic telegraph in the fourth century B.C., 45 and
reimplementation of command symbol systems can be found everywhere
from naval flag signaling to telegraph ciphers to hospital color codes. 46
More recently, modern Internet technical standards are systems of
command words that are reimplemented in ways legally indistinguishable
from Google’s acts in Google. 47 Indeed, Oracle itself has reimplemented
interfaces devised by IBM and Amazon, both times to enable users of
those firms’ dominant technologies to switch over to Oracle’s competing
products with minimal disruption. 48
Courts have struggled mightily on the question of whether
reimplementation is copyright infringement. Baker v. Selden, the seminal
case on the idea-expression dichotomy, is arguably a reimplementation
case insofar as Baker’s copies of Selden’s accounting forms enabled
accountants familiar with the latter forms to also fill the former. 49 Mitel,
Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc. involved a system of numerical codes that defined
commands to a telephone calling system, which the Tenth Circuit found
43 Id. at 1203 (quoting Brief of the R Street Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 35, at 2).
44 See, e.g., ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, MODERN OPERATING SYSTEMS 44 (2d ed. 2001).
45 See 4 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 10.43–.46, at 207–19 (W.R. Paton trans., W. Heinemann
1925) (c. 150 A.D.), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001181795 [https://perma.cc/5G96G9AZ]; Massimo Guarnieri, A Historical Survey on Light Technologies, 6 IEEE ACCESS 25881,
25882 (2018).
46 See generally Brief of the R Street Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 35, at 6–15 (citing sources).
47 See Duan, supra note 10, at 11–21.
48 See Timothy B. Lee, Before It Sued Google for Copying from Java, Oracle Got Rich Copying
IBM’s SQL, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2020), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/03/beforeit-sued-google-for-copying-from-java-oracle-got-rich-copying-ibms-sql [https://perma.cc/33VCKTQD]; Charles Duan, Oracle Copied Amazon’s API—Was That Copyright Infringement?, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 3, 2020), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/01/oracle-copied-amazons-apiwas-that-copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/YV5D-AAS7].
49 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
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not copyrightable; 50 Practice Management Information Corp. v.
American Medical Ass’n involved a system of numerical codes that
defined commands for medical insurance reimbursement, which the
Ninth Circuit held copyrightable. 51 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International, Inc. offered an ideal opportunity to resolve the question, as
the case involved a claim of copyright to a spreadsheet program’s menu
command names that programmers could use to automate data
processing. 52 The First Circuit rejected the copyright claim, 53 but on a
granted certiorari petition the Supreme Court split four-to-four and
established no precedential opinion on the question. 54
C.

The Supreme Court Decision and Remaining Questions

Google is the latest word on whether reimplementation is copyright
infringement. The case presented two questions based on separate
decisions of the Federal Circuit: 55 whether the declaring code was proper
subject matter for copyright protection in view of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), as
the Federal Circuit held; 56 and whether Google’s reimplementation of it
for Android was fair use, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s holding that it
was “not fair as a matter of law.” 57 The Court declined to address the
former question, 58 and resolved the latter in favor of Google, holding its
act of reimplementation to be fair use “as a matter of law.” 59
As an initial matter, the majority opinion by Justice Breyer observed
that fair use has “an important role in determining the lawful scope of a
computer program copyright,” and that fair use serves a “basic purpose
of providing a context-based check that can help to keep a copyright
monopoly within its lawful bounds.” 60 Turning to the four statutory
factors for fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, the Court found that they all
favored fair use, largely relying on the fact that the declaring code’s value
lay in programmers’ investment of time to learn the names of commands

See Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1368–70, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997).
See Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 517–18, 520 n.8 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
52 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809–10 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam).
53 See id. at 819.
54 See Lotus Dev., 516 U.S. 233.
55 See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1194–95 (2021).
56 See Oracle II, 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
57 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
58 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1197.
59 Id. at 1209.
60 Id. at 1198.
50
51
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rather than the expressive creativity of the code, 61 the value that Google’s
reimplementation created in offering a novel platform for the creation of
new software, 62 and the public benefits of innovation and competition
resulting from reimplementation. 63
Although the Court’s holding resolved the case in favor of Google,
there are still open questions about reimplementation. Since the Court
relied on fair use to resolve the case, 64 a future litigant could assert
copyright infringement against a reimplementer and argue that Google is
distinguishable on its facts, a possibility made likely by the “notoriously
fact sensitive” nature of the fair use inquiry. 65 And the question of
copyrightability of interfaces, which the Court declined to resolve, 66 will
likely not converge on an answer any time soon, particularly given that
the appellate court most likely to decide the issue is one that binds no
regional circuit court and yet one that, as a practical matter, is likely to
receive every interface copyright case in view of forum shopping
strategies. 67 While the Supreme Court’s decision cleared much of the air
over reimplementation and copyright, the cloud of concern cannot be said
to have been fully lifted yet.
D.

Other Barriers to Reimplementation

Purported copyright protection of interfaces is not the only barrier
to reimplementation. Other intellectual property rights, most notably
patents, can prevent competitors from reimplementing interfaces
necessary for compatibility with third-party products. 68 There are
numerous patents on multimedia storage formats, for example, which
might prevent competing music players from opening Apple audio files. 69
Firms may also use contractual terms or digital rights management
technologies to prevent competitors from reimplementation. 70 Indeed,
See id. at 1201–02, 1208.
See id. at 1203–04.
63 See id. at 1206.
64 See id. at 1197.
65 Georgia v. Pub.Res.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1513 (2020); see Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1197.
67 See Menell, supra note 36, at 1595.
68 See Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1943, 1965–69 (2009) (citing examples of patents on interfaces); Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale
of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, and the Internet, 93 DENV. L. REV. 855, 860 (2016).
69 See Dolby Labs., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 36 (Jan. 28, 2021) (noting ownership
of patent licensing pools “for audio coding, interactive television, digital radio, and wireless
technologies”).
70 See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L.
61
62
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companies often assert the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 71 to
undermine competitors’ ability to retrieve information otherwise
available online. 72 One can imagine using the CFAA against
reimplementers. 73
Between trailing uncertainty in the wake of Google and noncopyright legal regimes, there are plenty of barriers that a firm could put
up to prevent reimplementation. To the extent that reimplementation is
virtuous in terms of policy, then, legislators have work to do even after
the Supreme Court’s decision. But is reimplementation good public
policy? It is to that question that this Article now turns.
III. INTERCONNECTION REQUIRES REIMPLEMENTATION
If interconnection is desirable policy, as many legislators and
experts believe, 74 then removing barriers to reimplementation must also
be on the legislative agenda. That is because, despite their facial
differences, interconnection and reimplementation are perhaps as the
Dread Pirate Roberts was to the farmhand Westley: two components of a
unified interoperability whole, such that the former entails the latter. 75
Initially, it may seem that interconnection does not require
reimplementation. A major social media company could interconnect
with all of its smaller competitors without the means of connection being
standardized; Facebook could have one set of commands for working
with LinkedIn, another set for Twitter, another for TikTok, and so on. Yet
while fragmented interconnection is theoretically possible, the need for
reimplementation grows out of the overall motivation for
interconnection: to increase competition and reduce the influence of
REV. 875, 899–903 (1999) (describing use of contracts as effective intellectual property
protections); AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 4 (2016) (“[A]ggressive intellectual property laws,
restrictive contractual provisions, and technological locks have weakened end user control over the
digital goods we acquire.”).
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
72 See Kadri, supra note 10, at 971–74; Jamie L. Williams, Automation Is Not “Hacking”: Why
Courts Must Reject Attempts to Use the CFAA as an Anti-Competitive Sword, 24 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 416, 446–49 (2018); Charles Duan, Hacking Antitrust: Competition Policy and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 19 COLO. TECH. L.J. 313, 320–31 (2021).
73 See Duan, supra note 72, at 321–22; Breana Love, Comment, The Chaos of the CFAA:
Facebook’s Successful CFAA Claim Affects Website Owners, Competitors, and You, 50 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 831, 845 (2017) (describing competition concerns resulting from interpretation of the
CFAA in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016)).
74 See supra Section I.B.
75 It is trivial to show that reimplementation requires interconnection. The purpose of
reimplementing a system is to enable third parties to transmit identical commands to the new
system. See supra text accompanying note 35. Transmitting those commands requires a mode of
communication and thus interconnection. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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dominant firms in information technology markets. 76 To see why
interconnection policy can achieve robust competition only in tandem
with freedom to reimplement, I begin by outlining a framework of
interconnection, and then consider how competition policy works within
that framework.
A.

Horizontal and Vertical Interconnection

Drawing from antitrust law, 77 interconnection between any two
services may be described as “horizontal” or “vertical.” In a horizontal
relationship, the connected services are market substitutes that serve
similar consumers. 78 The purpose of interconnection is to enable one
service’s consumers to access the other service’s resources—enabling
users of Facebook to direct-message LinkedIn users, for example.
By contrast, a vertical relationship is present between systems and
upstream or downstream users: mobile phone operating systems and the
apps that run on them, for example, or a social media platform and its
users who produce posts and other content. 79 As with the antitrust notion
of verticality, the term refers to relationships between producers and
consumers. 80 But the unusual bidirectional nature of information
technology makes it sometimes unclear who is which: users both produce
content on Facebook and consume it from the platform, for example. 81
B.

Reimplementation and Vertical Interconnection

To see where reimplementation fits in, consider first vertical
interconnection, say between a social media platform and the apps atop

See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 385; STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY
ECON. & THE STATE, supra note 23, at 16; CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 27, at 71.
Interoperability can also have other benefits, such as enhancing free speech and media diversity,
but these benefits generally derive from increased competition. See BROWN, supra note 6, at 27–
46; MIKE MASNICK, PROTOCOLS, NOT PLATFORMS: A TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH TO FREE
SPEECH 14–26 (Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. 2019).
77 See, e.g., HANNO F. KAISER, A PRIMER IN ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 20, 22 (2009),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=381
[https://perma.cc/
Q2E5-E588].
78 See Kerber & Schweitzer, supra note 2, at 51.
79 See id. at 52.
80 See KAISER, supra note 77, at 20, 22.
81 See generally Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2143, 2153–58 (2018) (discussing complexities of two-sided
markets present for many digital platforms).
76
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it. Many proponents of interoperability policy favor opening up vertical
interconnection as a first step. 82
But without a right of reimplementation, vertical interconnection
could actually enhance the platform’s dominance. In order to grow, a
startup social media platform would need to attract apps on the dominant
platform to switch over. 83 If the startup uses an incompatible app
interface, then the costs of rewriting apps for the startup platform would
likely dissuade switching and stunt the new platform’s growth. 84
Reimplementation of the app interface thus takes on outsized importance
to the competition that vertical interoperability enables.
C.

Reimplementation and Horizontal Interconnection

This value of reimplementation for switching vertical relationships
over to competitors is reason enough to facilitate reimplementation as a
policy matter. But the switching cost problem also shows the need for
reimplementation in purely horizontal contexts.
A startup competitor to a dominant platform would want not only to
interconnect with the dominant platform but also with other
intermediately successful competitors. 85 A newly launched social media
messaging service, for example, would need to exchange messages not
only with Facebook but also with LinkedIn, Twitter, TikTok, and others.
If the command names that LinkedIn uses to interoperate with Facebook
were copyright-protected, however, someone (either LinkedIn or the new
82 See, e.g., CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 27, at 60 (favoring “protocol” and “data”
interoperability over “full protocol interoperability”).
83 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 191–92 (1999) (“[C]ompatibility with the installed base of equipment is
often critical to the launch of a new generation of technology.”); cf. Audrey Watters, Cloud
Community Debates, Is Amazon S3’s API the Standard? (And Should It Be?), READWRITE (July
12, 2010), https://readwrite.com/2010/07/12/cloud-community-debates-is-ama [https://perma.cc/
UUL2-YKCP] (noting multiple competitors’ reimplementations of Amazon’s AWS cloud
computing interface).
84 Cf. Amit Tiwari, How Much Does It Cost to Convert an iOS App to Android, BUS. 2 CMTY.
(Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.business2community.com/mobile-apps/how-much-does-it-cost-toconvert-an-ios-app-to-android-02366029 [https://perma.cc/FHV3-29VL] (estimating costs of
porting an app from iOS to Android at between $10,000 and $80,000); Jigar Mistry, How to Convert
iOS App to Android App (Cost + Challenges), SPACEO TECHS. (May 21, 2021),
https://www.spaceotechnologies.com/convert-ios-app-to-android-app
[https://perma.cc/XY6PVLWC] ($6,000 to $20,000); DJ Wardynski, How Much Does It Cost to Convert an iOS App to
Android?, BRAINSPIRE (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.brainspire.com/blog/how-much-does-it-costto-convert-an-ios-app-to-android [https://perma.cc/PS25-YAQA] (describing challenges of
converting apps from one platform to another).
85 See Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 9, at 24 (describing an interoperability regime where
“entering platforms would each have a bridge to Facebook.com, but not to each other” as “a
dysfunctional market”).
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service) would need to devise new commands for message exchange
between the new system and LinkedIn. Multiplied over all other systems,
the costs of development for new entrants to a “fragmented” ecosystem
of incompatible interfaces would likely also defeat competition. 86
Accordingly, insofar as the goal of interconnection policy is robust
competition, reimplementation must be a part of that policy. Without it,
competition on vertical market features such as app stores would be
hindered by switching costs and lock-in effects, and horizontal
competition would be limited to an oligopoly of a few large firms.
IV. IMPLEMENTING REIMPLEMENTATION
To obtain the sorts of competitive digital markets that
interoperability-bent policymakers desire, policymakers must consider
how to facilitate reimplementation. This Section considers several case
studies and options for doing so.
A.
1.

Case Studies

Power Frequencies

Historically, interoperability efforts have involved both
reimplementation and interconnection. One early example involved the
changing of the power grid in Southern California in 1948. 87 Prior to then,
most of the country’s power plants output alternating current at a
frequency of 60 Hz, but the Mill Creek plant serving Southern California
operated at 50 Hz, and power plants built in the area thereafter used the
same unusual frequency. 88 Appliances such as electric clocks
occasionally relied on the electrical frequency and so had to be built
differently for California than the rest of the country; a New York clock
brought to Los Angeles would literally slow down. 89
When the region finally decided to modernize so that it could receive
electricity from the newly built Hoover Dam, it was changing its
interconnection expectations—the wires would now transmit at 60 Hz
rather than 50—and so it had to deal with a reimplementation problem as
See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 83, at 256.
See generally H.W. Tice et al., A System Frequency Change, 67 ELEC. ENG’G 866 (1948);
Nathan Masters, Before 1948, LA’s Power Grid Was Incompatible with the Rest of the US,
GIZMODO (Feb. 4, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://gizmodo.com/before-1948-las-power-grid-wasincompatible-with-the-r-1683629042 [https://perma.cc/5686-TLN7].
88 See Tice et al., supra note 87, at 866.
89 See Masters, supra note 87.
86
87
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well, in the form of updated appliances. 90 Southern California Edison
exchanged hundreds of thousands of clocks, lights, and refrigerators to
ensure that every appliance in service used the standard 60 Hz
frequency—essentially ensuring that California appliances were
reimplementations of those on other electric grids. 91
2.

Digital Television

While intellectual property was not of concern in the electric
frequency switchover—a single frequency cannot be copyrighted—it
would figure prominently in other government interoperability efforts.
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States embarked
on a massive conversion of the broadcast television system from analog
to digital signals, a process called the “DTV transition.” 92 As part of that
transition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued
regulations mandating that television manufacturers and broadcasters
comply with a collection of technical standards promulgated by the
Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) for digitizing
broadcast signals. 93 The DTV transition thus illustrated the close tie
between interconnection and reimplementation: at the same time that the
FCC was instructing broadcasters and device manufacturers on how to
interconnect with each other, it was also requiring those firms to
reimplement the commands and signals promulgated in the ATSC
standards. 94
If ATSC had been able to wield unfettered intellectual property
rights over its standards, then the FCC action would have rendered the
entire television ecosystem beholden to that one industry consortium. 95
Keenly interested in avoiding the monopolization of the television
industry, the FCC indicated its intention to scrutinize ATSC’s intellectual

See Tice et al., supra note 87, at 866–67.
See id. at 877–80; Masters, supra note 87.
92 See Jeffrey A. Hart, The Transition to Digital Television in the United States: The Endgame,
1 INT’L J. DIGIT. TELEVISION 7, 7–8 (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2690003 [https://perma.cc/9GJV-LJQ4].
93 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.682(d) (2021); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact Upon the
Existing Television Broad. Serv., 11 FCC Rcd. 17771, 17787 (1996) (fourth report and order),
amended by 12 FCC Rcd. 3388 (1997).
94 Notably, the FCC did not fully specify the standards for interconnection between
broadcasters and devices, which “guaranteed that there would be confusion in the marketplace of
DTV equipment and services.” Hart, supra note 92, at 19.
95 See generally Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2015);
Timothy S. Simcoe, Private and Public Approaches to Patent Hold-up in Industry Standard
Setting, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 59, 61 (2012).
90
91
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property practices. 96 The agency observed ATSC members’ promises to
license patent rights to its standards on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, and reserved power to intervene if ATSC or its
members failed to abide by those promises. 97 This concern carries over
to the present day: as the FCC considers upgrading its regulations to the
newer ATSC 3.0 standards, it continues to rely on promises of fair patent
licensing and has noted its willingness to step in otherwise. 98
3.

Electronic Health Records

Probably the most comprehensive recent interoperability effort
explicitly recognized and dealt with reimplementation. Electronic health
records (EHR) have tantalizingly promised the possibility of a
revolutionized health care system, but adoption of that technology has
been stymied because EHR system vendors have not made their systems
interoperable, instead using technical and legal means to prevent patients
and hospitals from bringing records to or viewing them on competitors’
systems. 99 In the 21st Century Cures Act, 100 Congress directed the
Department of Health and Human Services to prohibit these practices of
“information blocking” through regulations, 101 and also to establish
national standards for EHR interchange. 102
The wide-ranging “interoperability” rules, finalized last year,
address both interconnection and reimplementation in detail. 103 The
section addressing information blocking strictly limits the permissible
reasons for which an EHR vendor may restrict the flow of information to
a competing system or to a third-party application, thereby limiting

96 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 11
FCC Rcd. at 17794.
97 See id.
98 See Authorizing Permissive Use of the “Next Generation” Broad. Television Standard, 32
FCC Rcd. 9930, 9981 n.300 (2017) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
99 See generally Michelle M. Mello, Julia Adler-Milstein, Karen L. Ding & Lucia Savage,
Legal Barriers to the Growth of Health Information Exchange—Boulders or Pebbles?, 96
MILBANK Q. 110, 130–32 (2018); OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH.,
REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 15–19 (2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/
default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3LQ-8R6U].
100 See 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act), Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj–300jj-52).
101 See § 300jj-52(b)(1) (granting the Inspector General of HHS authority to investigate and
penalize instances of information blocking).
102 See § 300jj-11(c)(1)(A) (granting the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology the power to endorse standards for health information exchange).
103 21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health IT
Certification Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 25642 (May 1, 2020) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170, 171).
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barriers to interconnection among those systems and applications. 104
Further recognizing that interoperability may require competitors or
third-party applications to engage in reimplementation, the information
blocking rule constructs a detailed intellectual property licensing
procedure, 105 including requirements that royalty rates be fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory. 106
As these examples show, policymakers looking to introduce
interoperability into technology markets have addressed not only
interconnection but also reimplementation to ensure success in achieving
their objectives of greater competition and consumer choice. Lawmakers
hoping to achieve those goals today should similarly consider a dualpronged approach of promoting both interconnection and
reimplementation.
B.

Legislative Options

Lawmakers have a variety of options for enabling reimplementation
in social media and Internet platform markets. This Section considers
three such options: mandatory compliance with particular
communication standards, conditions upon a class of dominant firms, and
general abrogation of legal barriers to replication.
To aid in this discussion, consider an example policy of enabling
person-to-person messaging among multiple platforms—a Facebook
message, say, being deliverable to a LinkedIn user and vice versa.
Obviously other policies for opening up social media and Internet
markets will face different considerations, but this example is effective in
showing both faces of interoperability: the different messaging platforms
obviously must interconnect with each other, and they ought to
reimplement interfaces to ensure interchangeability and thus robust
competition.
1.

Government-Adopted Standards

The case studies show that standardization is often a way of
mandating interconnection and enabling reimplementation in tandem.
Thus, to guarantee a right to reimplement, the government could devise
technical standards of commands and syntaxes and then require or
otherwise encourage firms to comply with those standards. For example,
a federal agency could draw up protocols for message exchange and
See 45 C.F.R. § 171.103(a)(1) (2021).
See 45 C.F.R. § 171.303(a) (2021).
106 See 45 C.F.R. § 171.303(b).
104
105
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require that social media firms accept communications in compliance
with those protocols. Since the government cannot hold copyrights in its
own works and could otherwise abstain from asserting rights in the
standards, 107 firms would face potentially no barriers to reimplementing
them.
A serious concern with government-developed standards, however,
is that federal regulators do not necessarily have the technical expertise
or industry experience to know how to craft them effectively. 108 As a
result, such standards are largely prohibited under current executive
policy. 109
A better option, widely used in government today, would be to
delegate the actual construction of the standard to a private industry
consortium. 110 Both the EHR interoperability regulations and the ATSC
standards adopted during the DTV transition fit this pattern. 111 In this
case, though, privately held copyrights and other intellectual property
interests could hold up reimplementation. 112 Contractual arrangements by
the standard-setting industry consortia, often called “FRAND
obligations,” could alleviate these barriers to reimplementation. 113
However, existing FRAND obligations often fail to address
copyrights, 114 and in any event the scope and effect of these contracts is
heavily disputed and uncertain. 115 Furthermore, even industry-devised
standards may lock in present technologies and limit future innovation, 116
See 17 U.S.C. § 105(a).
See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REVISION OF OMB
CIRCULAR A-119, FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 1 (2016) [hereinafter
OMB CIRCULAR A-119 (2016)], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/
revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3JU-3AGD] (executive policy against
government-authored standards is “intended to encourage Federal agencies to benefit from the
expertise of the private sector”); see also id. at 14 (noting interest in eliminating government costs
of developing standards and providing incentives for private industry to develop standards).
109 See id. at 17 (prohibiting “government-unique standards . . . except where inconsistent with
law or otherwise impractical”).
110 See, e.g., Kades & Scott Morton, supra note 9, at 23.
111 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 170.215 (2021) (adopting external standards for health care
interoperability); 47 C.F.R. § 73.682(d) (2021) (adopting ATSC standards for digital television).
112 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECONOMY 119, 136 (2001).
113 See id. at 128; Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents
for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007). FRAND stands for “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory”;
the term RAND (dropping “fair”) is considered equivalent. See id. at 671–72.
114 See Duan, supra note 10, at 31.
115 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1693–94
(2020) (noting multiple disputes over interpretation of FRAND obligations).
116 See, e.g., CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 27, at 59. But see Kades & Scott Morton, supra note
9, at 24–25 (contending that innovation ancillary to the standard will outweigh such lock-in).
107
108
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and they may favor large, dominant firms that can heavily influence
standard-setting consortia. 117 Mandatory interoperability standards,
whether authored by the government or private industry, are at best a
limited strategy for bolstering competition.
2.

Conditions upon Regulated Firms

Rather than enabling reimplementation of particular interoperability
standards, it may be better to enable reimplementation of any interface
that a dominant firm adopts to serve a certain market. For example,
Facebook might be required to provide a public set of commands for
messaging and allow any competitor to access it without charge. This
approach has been used in the past, as a condition of the merger between
America Online and Time Warner for example, 118 and it is currently
being proposed in Congress. 119 Under such an approach, the dominant
firm would be required to waive or cheaply license any intellectual
property rights needed to replicate the necessary interoperability
commands or protocols, and otherwise not inhibit reimplementation. 120
By contrast to technical standards adoption, a requirement that a
dominant firm permit reimplementation does not lock industry into a
particular technology, enabling further innovation. But applying policy
only to firms after they achieve market dominance essentially fixes that
policy one step behind the ball. While interoperability can encourage
competition against a monopoly player, other network effects and
switching costs may nevertheless still give the dominant firm an edge and
keep competitors at bay. 121 Better would be policy that encourages
interoperability before dominant players arise, thereby achieving the
117 In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., for example, steel industry
representatives colluded to exclude plastic tubing from a technical standard on electrical conduit,
thereby leveraging the standard to exclude competitors. See 486 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1988).
118 See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. & Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc.,
Transferee, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547, 6627–28 (2001); Matthew A. Goldberg, Comment, Message in a
Bottleneck: The Need for FCC-Mandated Interoperability Among Instant Messaging Providers, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 133, 140 (2005).
119 See Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 2019
(ACCESS Act), S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (as introduced in Senate, Oct. 22, 2019); Mike
Masnick, The Good and the Bad of the ACCESS Act to Force Open APIs on Big Social Media,
TECHDIRT (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191022/18012743247/good-badaccess-act-to-force-open-apis-big-social-media.shtml [https://perma.cc/VJ47-QZFP].
120 See, e.g., S. 2658, §§ 4(c)(2)(B), 4(c)(4) (requiring fees and usage limits on interoperability
interfaces to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and requiring interface specifications to be
public).
121 See generally SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 83, at 103–04 (describing lock-in effects with
technology).
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benefits of competitive markets from the start and avoiding the need for
remedial, likely imperfect, action after the fact.
3.

Legislating on Software Copyrights

Prospective achievement of interoperability and competition might
best be achieved by removing barriers to reimplementation entirely.
Congress could expand upon the Google decision by answering the
undecided question of copyrightability of interfaces, thereby ensuring
that reimplementation is not hindered by copyright law. 122 It could further
review other laws such as the CFAA that can inhibit reimplementation. 123
Obviously, these measures would enable reimplementation to the
greatest extent. The question is whether they would go too far, perhaps
coming at the expense of other policy interests. In particular, one might
worry that diminishing exclusive intellectual property rights would
diminish incentives to create new interfaces, since competitors can
“freeload off of” them. 124
This concern is minimized by several considerations. For one thing,
incentives to create interfaces would seem unnecessary—a programmer
writing software must produce an interface for it if that software is to be
used at all. 125 It is also not clear that reimplementation of interfaces
always harms the creator’s market; many software firms in fact seek to
have their interfaces incorporated into open standards to expand their
markets and attract consumers. 126 And any concern about diminished
incentives must be offset by the downstream benefits of compatibility and
innovation that arise from reimplementation. 127
More importantly, a page of history is worth a volume of intellectual
property theory. Despite legal uncertainty about the copyrightability of
computer software interfaces, the information technology industry has
proceeded on the assumption that reimplementation was legally

See HICKEY, supra note 14, at 4.
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
124 With High Court Mum on Java Copyrights, Is Innovation Safe?, LAW360 (July 1, 2015)
(quoting Krish Gupta, EMC Corp.), https://www.law360.com/articles/674082/with-high-courtmum-on-java-copyrights-is-innovation-safe [https://perma.cc/MZ29-M9JB]; see also Google LLC
v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Evan Weidner,
Comment, A Little Overlap Never Hurt Anyone: Overlapping IP Rights and Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Google LLC, 4 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 212, 226 (2020).
125 See Fred von Lohmann, The New Wave: Copyright and Software Interfaces in the Wake of
Oracle v. Google, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 517, 529 (2018) (“After all, the incentive to create a
method of operating something is inherent in the incentive to create the thing itself.”).
126 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 83, at 229–31.
127 See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1203–04 (majority opinion).
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permissible since the dawn of that industry. 128 Even Oracle’s flagship
database product reimplemented the commands and syntaxes of IBM’s
SQL interface, 129 and evidence from public licensing policies shows that
top industry professionals and the federal government have long believed
that patents were the only intellectual property relevant to
reimplementation of technical standards. 130
And yet there has been no shortage of production of interoperability
interfaces. “Open Internet standards” by the thousands can be
“implemented around the world in all kinds of Internet products and
services,” which the Internet Society describes as “the cornerstone of the
Internet’s success.” 131 The success of the Internet, built on unhindered
reimplementation of millions of lines of software interfaces made freely
available, rebuffs the notion that such interfaces will not be produced
absent intellectual property rights.
In sum, an expansion of Google to further remove barriers to
reimplementation would likely not affect the production of interfaces, and
it will most effectively allow Internet platform competitors to rise without
locking in existing technologies in the ways that predefined standards
might do. In tandem with interconnection, broad rights to reimplement
could create the highly interoperable, competitive digital landscape that
many lawmakers and policy experts would like to achieve.
CONCLUSION
Defining interoperability is no simple task: an extensive study of the
subject finds “no one-size-fits-all definition” and exhorts the reader to
“explore a broader understanding” of interoperability “in different
See Duan, supra note 10, at 3–4.
See Lee, supra note 48; DIG. SYS. RSCH. CTR., THE 1995 SQL REUNION: PEOPLE, PROJECTS,
AND POLITICS 15 (Paul McJones ed., 1997), https://www.mcjones.org/System_R/SQL_Reunion_
95/SRC-1997-018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A9L-7FV5] (Oracle founder Larry Ellison “wanted to
make sure that his product was fully compatible with [IBM’s SQL language], right down to the
error code values” (quoting Don Chamberlin, a principal designer of the SQL interface language at
IBM)).
130 See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 10, at 36 (“As a generality, the issue of what might
be referred to as ‘essential copyrights’ is rarely dealt in an effective way in IPR policies.”); Duan,
supra note 10, at 31–35; Brief of the R Street Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 35, at 25–27 (identifying assumption that interfaces are not subject to copyright
protection in OMB CIRCULAR A-119 (2016), supra note 108).
131 INTERNET SOC’Y, OPEN INTERNET STANDARDS: AN INTERNET SOCIETY PUBLIC POLICY
BRIEFING
1
(2015),
https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ISOCPolicyBrief-OpenStandards-20151030-nb.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ44-JF35]; see Dan York,
Celebrating 50 Years of the RFCs That Define How the Internet Works, INTERNET SOC’Y (Apr. 7,
2019), https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2019/04/celebrating-50-years-of-the-rfcs-that-definehow-the-internet-works [https://perma.cc/WL6T-KK8P] (noting “over 8,500” Internet standards
documents from one standard-setting organization).
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contexts and at different levels.” 132 Toward this broader understanding,
this Article contributes a characterization of the relationship between
interconnection and reimplementation, two elements of interoperability
that at once seem entirely different and yet are closely linked.
As policymakers look to interoperability as a tool for enhancing
competition, innovation, and consumer choice, they will need to ensure
that pro-interoperability policies address reimplementation. History
shows that both can be addressed, 133 and this Article has presented
several options for ensuring that reimplementation is enabled in tandem
with interconnection. In particular, legislation addressing interface
copyrights may have a profound effect on overcoming market
concentration in the technology industry. 134 The confluence between
interest in social media interoperability and the Google decision could
thus produce, in the words of one impressive clergyman, a legislative
“mawidge” that “is what bwings us togevver today.” 135
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134 See supra Section IV.B.
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